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Electoral Voting and Population Distribution in the 
United States
Paul Kvam
In the United States, the electoral system for determining the president is controversial and sometimes confusing to voters keeping track of election outcomes. Instead of 
directly counting votes to decide the winner of a presidential 
election, individual states send a representative number of 
electors to the Electoral College, and they are trusted to cast 
their collective vote for the candidate who won the popular 
vote in their state. 
Forty-eight states and Washington, DC, employ the win-
ner-takes-all method, each awarding its electors as a single 
bloc. Maine and Nebraska select one elector within each 
congressional district by popular vote and the remaining two 
electors by the aggregate, statewide popular vote. Due to 
this all-or-nothing outcome, the winner of the popular vote 
will not always be the candidate who wins the most electoral 
votes—such as in the 2000 election.
There are numerous critics of the current system who point 
out how its weaknesses are exacerbated by the naturally uneven 
spread of the country’s population across the 50 states and that 
every state—no matter how sparsely populated—is guaranteed 
to have at least three electoral votes out of the total 538. Two of 
the votes correspond to two congressional senators that repre-
sent each state, independent of the state population. 
Under the current rules, the value of a vote differs from state 
to state. A large state such as California has an immense effect 
on the national election, but, compared to a sparsely populated 
state such as Alaska, is grossly under-represented in the U.S. 
senate, where all senators have an equal vote. Arnold Barnett 
and Edward Kaplan, in their 2007 CHANCE article, “A Cure for 
the Electoral College?” called the Electoral College “the fun-
house mirror of American politics” and suggested a weighted 
voting system that would mitigate the problem caused by the 
present winner-take-all rule.
An Examination of the Impact of California
Figure 1 illustrates the allotment of electoral votes from 2000–
2008. California has 55 out of the total 538. That’s already more 
than the 11 Vice President Walter Mondale achieved in the 
1980 election against President Ronald Reagan, more than the 
49 President Jimmy Carter achieved against Reagan in 1980, 
more than the 17 Sen. George McGovern achieved against 
President Richard Nixon in 1972, and more than the 52 Sen. 
Barry Goldwater achieved against President Lyndon Johnson in 
1964. Given that 270 votes are needed to secure the majority, 
the candidate who wins the most votes in California, even if by 
a slim majority, garners more than 20% of the electoral votes 
needed to win the national election.
The 538 electoral votes in the 2008 presidential elec-
tion were distributed among 50 states and the District of 
Columbia (DC). To simplify the language, we will treat DC as 
a state, because it has a minimum allotment of three electoral 
votes. So, we will refer to 51 states in this scenario. Consider 
a hypothetical situation within states in which candidates 
have an equal chance of winning the popular vote (and thus 
all of a state’s electoral votes) and state results are decidedly 
independent of one another. As mentioned previously, we 
are examining the impact of disparities, but not modeling the 
actual U.S. political landscape.
Suppose candidate A has won the popular vote in California 
over candidate B. If candidate A wins m out of 50 of the remain-
ing states, then the electoral votes of candidate A will be the 
sum of the electoral votes of those m states plus the votes in 
California. Excluding California, the average number of votes 
per state is 9.66, and the standard deviation is 7.25 votes. The 
mean number of votes out of the remaining for candidate 
A can be calculated as the mean of the conditional mean. 
That is, if candidate A wins M states, the average number of 
votes is 9.66M. If M—the number of states—has a binomial 
Figure 1. Electoral votes in 2008 for 50 states and the District of 
Columbia (not in figure: Hawaii (4 votes) and Alaska (3 votes))
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distribution with n = 50 independent trials and probability of 
going for candidate A of p = 1/2, then the expected value of 
M is np = 50(1/2) = 25. Consequently, the expected number 
of additional votes for candidate A, under the simple coinflip 
model, is 9.66(25) = 241.5.
The calculation for the standard deviation of the number of 
votes is slightly more complicated, but uses a familiar formula 
from introductory probability theory. In words, the variance 
of the number of votes is the mean of the conditional variance 
plus the variance of the conditional mean. The standard devia-
tion is the square root of that number. In symbols,
  (1)
The variance of the votes given the number of states going 
for candidate A, assuming the states decide independently, is 
Var(Votes | M) = 7.252M. The expectation of this is 7.252(25) 
= 1314.06. As before, E(Votes | M) = 9.66M. The variance of 
M from the binomial distribution is np(1 – p) = 50(1/2)(1-1/2) 
= 12.5. A multiplier such as 9.66 in a variance is squared, so 
Var(E(Votes | M)) = 9.662(12.5) = 1166.45. Then, the standard 
deviation is the square root of the sum of the two parts: 
If the distribution of the number of additional electoral 
votes for candidate A is roughly normal, then the probability 
that candidate A gets the needed 215 additional votes to win 
is approximately 
    
    
    
    
         (2)
     
In this scenario, the candidate who wins California will win 
the general election about 70% of the time. The importance of 
California as a big state is clear, even if the simple assumptions—
such as a 50/50 coinflip for the candidate who wins California to 
win each other state—do not match political reality. No other 
state would have this large of a conditional probability.
Turning to another issue, can a probability model describe 
the uneven distribution of electoral votes across the states? If 
so, what can that model tell us about how the Electoral College 
disparity has changed since the electoral voting system was 
introduced 220 years ago?
A Multinomial Model for the Distribution of 
Electoral Votes
We will consider modeling the distribution of electoral votes 
to the 51 states. A multinomial distribution is a probability 
distribution for the number of items from a fixed total distrib-
uted to categories or classes. There is a probability for each 
category, which in this application are the 51 states. Under 
a multinomial model, the votes are distributed to the states 
independently of one another and with fixed probabilities of 
going to each state. To model the distribution of votes, it will 
make more mathematical sense to consider only the votes 
corresponding to the congressional seats that are not already 
guaranteed with minimum state population. Specifically, each 
state has two elected members of the Senate (the state popula-
tion does not matter) and at least one member in the House of 
Representatives. Additional representatives allotted to the state 
are based on population of the state and the constraint that the 
total number in Congress is 538.
Let X
1
,...,Xn be the electoral votes allocated to the n states 
from the remaining k =385 possible votes. Then, k =∑Xi = 385. 
Now the maximum from the n = 51 states in the 2008 elec-
tion is California, with 52, and eight sparsely populated states 
(again, including DC) have none. Can the multinomial model 
reasonably explain this distribution of votes?
A simple model is one for which votes are distributed to 
states independently with equal probability. This is a multi-
nomial model with constant chances for the 51 states, which 
will not suffice. Under this model, states would get 7.55 votes 
on average, with a standard deviation of 2.72 votes. The equal 
probability model does not characterize the extreme vari-
ability that allows eight states to end up with no votes while 
a single state ends up with 52.
Another approach is to treat the probabilities as unknown 
parameters and estimate them based on the actual observed 
electoral vote distributions. The maximum likelihood esti-
mates of the probabilities are simply the actual vote counts 
divided by the number of total votes. In California, for exam-
ple, the empirical probability is 52/385, or 13.5%. This model 
fits exactly, but it does not help us learn anything about the 
distribution beyond what we already know. In 2008, using this 
framework, we have exactly one sample—the actual number 
of electoral votes in the nation.
A Multivariate Polya Model
The multivariate Polya distribution (MPD) is closely related 
to the multinomial distribution when each bin (state) has a 
probability of receiving each of the k = 385 votes. The 51 
probabilities add to one. The probabilities, themselves, are 
modeled as arising from a mixing distribution. With more than 
two categories, it is called a Dirichlet distribution and is a model 
for probabilities adding to one. That is, the probabilities are 
thought of as arising independently from a single distribution. 
The resulting mixture distribution for the electoral vote counts 
is MDP. In the special case when n = 2, the model for the counts 
is a binomial probability model and the binomial probability 
parameter is assigned a beta distribution. The resulting mixed 
distribution is called a beta-binomial distribution. The multi-
variate Polya distribution has probability mass function
    
 (3)
where ∑xj = k and β is called the contagion parameter. The 
contagion parameter β regulates how evenly k votes will be 
distributed among n equally likely states.
To see how this works, consider a ball and urn problem in 
which n urns each contain β balls. Another ball is randomly 
placed in one urn with probability determined by the proportion 
of the balls in the urn. To start, each urn has an equally likely 
chance of getting the first ball. The second ball, however, is 
more likely to go to the same urn that received the first ball. If 
β is large, the chance does not increase much, but β also can 
P(Votes ≥ 215) ≈  1 – Φ 215 – 241.5
49.80
= 1 – Φ (-0.532) = 1 – 0.297 = 0.703.
E(Var(Votes | M)) + Var (E(Votes | M)).
1314.06 + 1166.45 = 49.80.
px (x1,...,xn) = 
k!
∏nj=1  xj!
∏
n T(xj + β)
T(β)
,T(nβ)
T(nβ + k) j=1  
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Figure 2. Goodness-of-fit test result for U.S. 2008 electoral vote data and the 
multivariate Polya distribution
be a fraction, and the first ball randomly placed in an urn can 
have a greater effect.
For example, as β goes to infinity (β ˆ| ∞), the contagion dis-
appears and the distribution of X converges to the multinomial 
distribution with equal probabilities (n; k; n –11), where 1 is an 
n-vector of ones. Conversely, as β decreases to zero (β 
ˇ
| 0), 
the contagion causes all the votes to be distributed to just 
one state, creating a maximum amount of unevenness. These 
opposite extremes for β also represent the extreme difference 
in multivariate Polya distributions in terms of entropy, includ-
ing Kullback-Leibler divergence.
Using the likelihood in (3), the maximum likelihood esti-
mator for b corresponding to the 2008 U.S. electoral map is 
 ^β = 0.507, with an approximate 95% confidence interval of 
(0.307, 0.836) based on the likelihood ratio. To ensure the 
MPD adequately fits the election data, we will apply a heuristic 
goodness-of-fit test.
Because the expected values for each state are identical, a 
standard chi-square test is generally ineffective. Alternatively, a 
test based on the expected values for the n order statistics (the 
values of X
1, …, 
Xn sorted in ascending order) of X can effectively 
distinguish MDP data from more general categorical distribu-
tions. A test can be constructed using simulation to construct 
95% confidence intervals for each order statistic based on 
MPD simulations. Simulating the MPD is relatively easy, as it 
can be constructed as a multinomial distribution with mixing 
parameter (p
1, …, 
pn) having a Dirichlet distribution. A Dirichlet 
vector can be composed from a vector of independent gamma 
random variables (with identical scale parameter) divided by 
their sum.
In Figure 2, the goodness-of-fit results are plotted for the 
51 states, which are ordered according to the number of 
electoral votes. (California is represented by the right-most 
plotted point.) The 95% confidence intervals are based on 105 
simulations. The apparent suitable fit reinforces the assertion 
that the contagion model can characterize the way electoral 
votes are distributed differently across the states. This simpli-
fies our modeling effort because the contagion model 
requires only one parameter to be estimated, instead of 
51 separate proportions.
Previous U.S. Elections
Since the first U.S. presidential election in 1789, when 
President George Washington essentially ran unopposed, the 
number of states has increased from its original 10 (listed in 
Table 1) to the current 51. The population (both absolute and 
relative) of those existing states in 1789, as well as most future 
states, has changed dramatically in the course of the last 200 
years. We are interested in finding out how the distribution of 
electoral votes across the states has evolved, in terms of the con-
tagion parameter, over this same course of time. Figure 3 shows 
how the estimate of β has changed, along with the number of 
states participating in the federal election, since 1789.
As the estimated contagion β has decreased over time, state 
populations have polarized toward small groups of heavily 
populated states and large groups of sparsely populated ones. 
The MPD model fit also changes from year to year, sometimes 
due to a large number of states that were constituted at the time 
of the census. To go along with Figure 3, Figure 4 displays the 
95% confidence intervals for the contagion parameter for each 
electoral vote configuration in the United States since 1789. 
In earlier elections, in which there is less certainty about the 
finiteness of the contagion parameter, the upper confidence 
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Figure 4. Estimated contagion parameter (with 95% confidence interval) for MPD model in 
past elections (1789–2008)
Figure 3. Estimated MPD contagion parameter and number of states in 
past elections (1789–2008)
CHANCE 23.1.indd   44
 
CHANCE        45
limit can become arbitrarily large. For this reason, the upper 
bounds in Figure 4 are cut off at β ≥ 3.5. 
The wider intervals corresponding to some earlier elec-
tions (including all elections before1820) suggest the MPD 
fit is better in more recent years. The MPD goodness of fit for 
the1789 data is illustrated in Figure 5. The plot does not belie a 
fit to the MDP. A goodness of fit for the multinomial distribu-
tion (with equal probabilities), however, has a chi-square test 
statistic of 13.6, with significance P(x2 
9
 ≥ 13.6) = 0.14. This is 
the best fit among all the election cycles that follow; all other 
significance values of the multinomial goodness-of-fit test are 
less than 0.01, indicating a clear lack of fit.
Given the somewhat uniform spread of the population 
across the 10 participating states in the 1789 election (see 
Table 1), it would be hard to believe the founding fathers or 
anyone else considered future elections based on five times 
as many states and such a dramatically less even population 
distribution. The contagion parameter (β), which represents 
a metric of population evenness or stability, is estimated to 
be largest (  ^β = 3) for the first election, but in every election 
after 1789, the estimate was much smaller—almost always 
less than one.
Table 1 shows that by the election of 1792—when Wash-
ington was re-elected—five more states were added to union 
and population disparity between the states increased greatly. 
Likewise, the contagion parameter decreased from 3.0 to 0.72. 
While Virginia accumulated a large population with a dominant 
number of electoral votes (21) in 1792, several smaller states 
had only the minimum number of three votes.
There are two noticeable drops in the contagion parameter 
in Figures 3 and 4. One was the 1824 election. Shortly before 
the 1820 election, five sparsely populated western territories 
gained statehood (i.e., Alabama, Illinois, Indiana, Mississippi, 
and Missouri). In this election, President James Monroe 
defeated President John Quincy Adams and was re-elected 
as president. The other drop is in 1868. In the 1864 election, 
several southern states did not participate in President Abraham 
Lincoln’s re-election.
The Effect of the Contagion Parameter
If the contagion parameter is sufficiently small, it becomes more 
likely that one or two states will dominate in terms of electoral 
votes. With the current rules that add two electoral votes to 
the minimum one each state gets based on relative population, 
the electoral college will never satisfy the 80/20 rule. That is, 
if 20% of the states have almost all the country’s population, 
they can never garner even 80% of the electoral votes with 51 
states. Currently, our most populated 10 states have less than 
half the total number of electoral votes. Even if we consider 
only the 385 electoral votes assigned after each state already has 
the three minimum electoral votes, simulation shows that 
the 80/20 rule is satisfied only with a contagion parameter 
of β ≤ 0.22.
To illustrate the influence the contagion parameter wields 
on a presidential election outcome, we again look at how the 
population disparity creates big states that dominate the oth-
ers in terms of electoral votes. We consider a population in 
which the two candidates have an equal chance of winning 
any individual state and examine the probability that the 
candidate who wins the largest state wins the election. This 
is how the “California effect” was computed earlier. We found 
Table 1—Electoral Vote Distribution for 
the 1789 and 1792 U.S. Federal Election 
 Electoral Votes
State 1789 1792
Virginia 10 21
Massachusetts 10 16
Pennsylvania 10 15
New York 12
North Carolina 12
Connecticut 7 9
Maryland 6 8
South Carolina 7 8
New Jersey 6 7
New Hampshire 5 6
Georgia 5 4
Kentucky 4
Rhode Island 4
Delaware 3 3
Vermont 3
Figure 5. Goodness-of-fit test result for U.S. 1789 electoral vote data 
and the multivariate Polya distribution
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Figure 6. The conditional probability (based on 106 simulations) a candidate will win the 
Election (vertical axis) given he or she has already won the largest state. Along the hori-
zontal axis, the contagion parameter, β, ranges from 0 to 5.
that if a candidate wins California and has a 50/50 chance of 
winning each of the remaining states, that candidate has a 
69.4% chance of winning the election.
We again let X = (X
1
,...,Xn) have a multivariate Polya distri-
bution where k = 358 votes are allotted to n = 51 states. The 
probability of winning the election, given the largest state is 
already won, increases as β decreases. Figure 6 shows how 
the probability of winning the general election goes to one 
as β decreases to zero. Furthermore, as β increases to infinity, 
the probability will correspond to the analogous model based 
on the multinomial distribution with equal bin probabilities. 
In that case, the largest state is not much larger than most of 
the other states, and the probability of winning the election 
is around 0.58.
From Figure 6, the probability of winning with β = 0.5 is 
about 0.71, which is in agreement with the approximation 
based on California being the biggest state in the 2000–2008 
electoral vote distribution. If we go back to the first election 
in 1789, where the population was more evenly spread across 
10 states and  ^β=3.0, the probability decreases to 0.62.
Achieving Evenness in the Electoral College
During the U.S. Constitutional Convention in 1787, the frame-
work for the Electoral College was created, delegating votes 
to states in proportion to its representatives in Congress. The 
United States was still an agrarian society at the time of the first 
federal election, and the new nation’s population was spread out 
somewhat uniformly among most of the 10 voting states.
It can be argued that this balance was part of the original 
design that emphasized constitutional rights as a mixture of 
state-based and population-based government. In “Federalist 
No. 39,” President James Madison proposed to have a Congress 
with two houses, one based on population (the House of 
Representatives) and one based on states (the Senate), with 
the election of the president also relying on this mixture of 
two government modes.
The balance achieved in the first election can be character-
ized in the statistical model based on the multivariate Polya 
distribution, where the contagion parameter was estimated 
as  ^β = 3.00. To achieve this kind of voting balance with our 
current population distribution, a lot of state lines would have 
to be redrawn. For example, if the United States collapsed 
North and South Dakota into one state, removing a star from 
the flag, this would move the contagion parameter from its 
current 0.5071 to 0.6461. To gain any substantial increase for 
β, all of the states with just three or four electoral votes would 
have to be conjoined with larger states. The 23rd Amendment, 
which guarantees at least three electoral votes to DC, would 
Advertising Dollars and 
Presidential Elections 
In 2008, the University of Wisconsin Advertising 
Project estimated that more than 50% of the cost of 
television advertisements was spent in just 10 states. 
In 2000, FairVote’s Presidential Elections Reform 
Program reported that the advertising money spent 
in Florida alone exceeded that of 45 states and 
the District of Columbia combined. The unequal 
advertising spending reflects how the electoral vote 
share is unequal across states and the outcome in 
some states is decided by small margins.
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Figure 7. The reconfigured United States, with 39 states and contagion 
parameter  ^β = 3.0. Modified states are shaded gray. Note that Alaska and 
Hawaii, not pictured, also are modified.
need rectification, and, more likely, DC would be swallowed 
by Maryland or Virginia.
To show how difficult this balance would be to achieve, 
following is an efficient (albeit facetious) 12-step master plan 
listed below that will increase the contagion parameter to its 
original  ^β = 3.0:
Split California into two states (i.e., Northern California 
and Southern California) based on the county lines start-
ing between San Bernardino and Tulare counties
Split off the New York City metropolitan area (including 
all of Long Island) from the state of New York
Split off west Texas, according to the vertical borders 
implied by its congressional districts, joining it with 
New Mexico
Join Montana, Wyoming, and Idaho
Add Alaska to Washington
Add Hawaii and Nevada to Northern California
Join Utah and Colorado
Join North Dakota, South Dakota, and Nebraska
Join Maine, Vermont, and New Hampshire
Join Virginia and West Virginia
Add Delaware and DC to Maryland
Join Connecticut and Rhode Island
The results of this splitting and mixing are displayed in 
Figure 7, based on population estimates for 2007. The New 
York City metropolitan area, as a new state, would garner 21 
electoral votes, while the remains of upstate New York would 
have 12. Among the 39 states in the reconfiguration, the lowest 
number of electoral votes for any state is six. No additional 
pairing significantly increased  ^β past 3.0.
Discussion
The reconfigured union of states displayed in Figure 7 serves 
to illustrate how much the population of the United States 
has changed since the Constitutional Convention. Barnett 
and Kaplan suggested that any constitutional amendment to 
change the electoral system directly has little or no chance of 
being approved because it would require a large number of 
small states to vote against their own interests. Their aim is to 
go through a side door by tweaking the system via a weighted 
vote share. The authors show that the results would be signifi-
cantly closer to matching a national popular vote.
An additional metric was provided here that reflects how 
the unevenness in population distribution translates into 
inequality of voting power between states. The key is to view 
the current distribution of population and electoral votes as 
one of many possible realities, depending on how the popula-
tion distributes itself into states, or how states are defined with 
respect to population density.
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